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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is primarily concerned with the theory that the writings of Seneca the Younger 
display an array of stylistic choices theretofore unprecedented in the production of philosophical 
works in Latin, as well as that, in so doing, Seneca is able to cultivate an approach to Latin 
literature that is uniquely Roman in character. By using two of the “dialogues” of Seneca—De 
otio and De breuitate uitae—as representative of his prose works, particularly those 
philosophical in nature, I analyze the author’s specific use of language in order to highlight and 
to detail those methods which he employs in an effort to appeal to singularly Roman sensibilities 
as opposed to the cultural menagerie Imperial Rome had become. Through careful philological 
investigation dedicated to understanding the source of contention between certain concepts and 
Senecan ideology, I come to conclude that Seneca’s approach to writing fits perfectly not only 
the Stoic platform to which he is primarily devoted, but also the sociopolitical climate of his day 
as he diligently attempts to communicate with his Roman audience on a level that they can truly 
comprehend. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the Author 
Early Life and Education 
 
 Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born in approximately 4 B.C.E. at Corduba (presently 
Córdoba, Spain) to a wealthy equestrian family. Early in life, he would have been introduced to 
the republican sentiments of his native Corduba, for the citizens here had sided with Pompey 
during the civil wars. This allegiance to the ideals of the Republic is evident when Sullivan 
reports that, later in his life, Seneca “…deplored most vehemently the tendency of Claudius’ 
regime to centralization and absolutism.”1 Likewise, following the accession of Nero to the 
imperial throne, Seneca was able to exercise more actively the influence of his childhood home2 
in state government, ushering in “…the celebrated period of Nero’s good government, based on 
principles of balance and conciliation between the powers of the princeps and the Senate.”3  
 Seneca began life perfectly positioned to enter the political arena. He carried with him the 
republican birthright of his Baetican4 heritage, as well as a substantial academic and political 
inheritance from his father, so one would expect a swift entrance into political life. However, 
perhaps as a result of some maternal imprint, Seneca’s penchant was more for the world of 
philosophical pursuits.5 As a child, he was brought to Rome and placed under the care and 
tutelage of a grammaticus, the bland barrenness of whose teachings Seneca met with only 
disdain. His training in rhetoric at the hands of such as Gallio and Mamercus Scaurus and at the 
indubitable insistence of his father offered some educational relief and would have a profound 
                                                             
1 Literature and Politics in the Age of Nero 117 
2 Although he left Spain at a young age, Seneca was apparently surrounded by Spaniards in the formative years of 
his life. For more on the education of Seneca and its connections to Spanish influence, see Bloomer, Latinity and 
Literary Society at Rome, Chapter IV. 
3 Conte 408 
4 Corduba was the principal city of Baetica, “…which was the most civilized province of Spain” (Duff 159). 
5 Seneca’s mother Helvia, as opposed to the rhetorical studies favored by her husband, possessed “a philosophical 
bent” (Op. cit. 160). 
2 
 
effect on his style.6 Nevertheless, Duff still alerts us to the fact that “[wi]th [Seneca’s] 
philosophical studies came a fuller satisfaction for intellect and spirit.”7 
 Under the guidance of three Sextian “graduates,”8 Seneca began to develop his initial 
philosophical notions. The lasting impressions of his teachers molded even some of the most 
basic aspects of his life. Based on Pythagorean argumentation from Sotion, Seneca decided to 
abstain from the consumption of meat, and the Stoic Attalus “…induced him to renounce 
perfumes, wines, oysters, mushrooms and a soft bed…” due to their contemptuous designation as 
luxuriae.9 Early on, Seneca was most attracted to the precepts of Stoicism and approached them 
with nearly religious fervor. He devoted himself utterly to the study of these philosophical, 
particularly Stoic, ideals and was a consummate student, so much so that he would fast 
vigorously until his health began to deteriorate and his father warned him against perception by 
some as a practitioner of foreign superstitions. 
Political Career 
 Perhaps as a result of the faltering condition of his wellbeing, Seneca departed for Egypt 
in around 26 C.E. where he would spend the next five years in the home of his aunt10 and her 
husband who was the governor there. Following his return to Rome, the same aunt also made use 
of her apparently considerable influence in the government to garner for Seneca the position of 
quaestor. Seneca’s declamatory prowess soon became widely recognized in this capacity, as did 
Caligula’s envy in turn. The boyish emperor would often make snide remarks concerning 
Seneca’s skills as an orator, even going so far as to exclaim “…Senecam tum maxime placentem 
‘commissiones meras’ componere et ‘harenam esse sine calce’ diceret (“…that it was then 
                                                             
6 I will more thoroughly discuss Senecan style at a later point in the Introduction. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Sotion, Attalus, and Papirius Fabianus 
9 Op. cit. 161 
10 Seneca does not provide us with a name for this family member, but he refers to her at Ad Helu. XIX.ii, iv-vi. 
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chiefly reported that pleasing Seneca composed ‘mere speeches’ and that he was ‘sand without 
lime.’”).11 Eventually, unable to bear the thought of inferiority to another,12 Caligula would have 
sentenced Seneca to execution; however, one of the choice members of court is likely to have 
persuaded him against such a harsh and unmerited verdict, primarily due to the rumors of 
existing terminal illness.13 
 Having dodged death at the hands of Caligula, Seneca’s endeavors continued to flourish. 
It is around this time that he decides to embark upon more literary and philosophical pursuits; 
however, this did not prevent him from attaining prominent status in the court of Claudius. 
Unfortunately, his success here was to be short-lived. As a member of the entourage for Julia 
Livilla and Agrippina, nieces of Claudius, he came under suspicion of immoral liaisons with the 
former, some think as a result of Messallina’s own political agenda.14 The accusation was 
brought before the Senate and the emperor, with the subsequent trial resulting in the senatorial 
verdict favoring the death penalty. Claudius, though, lessened the severity of the sentence and 
thus chose to relegate Seneca to Corsica, where he would reside from 41 until 49. Agrippina, 
then wife of Claudius, ultimately convinced the emperor to consent not only to Seneca’s return, 
but also to his appointment as praetor.  
Life in the Court of Nero-Death at the Hand of Nero 
                                                             
11 Suetonius, De uitis Caesarum: Vita Gai liii 
12 Cassius Dio this appraisal of the situation, alleging, that it was an emperor envious of Seneca’s oratory skill that 
relegated that statesman to Corsica: Δομίτιος μὲν δὴ καταγνωσθεὶς μηκέτι δεινὸς εἶναι λέγειν ἐσώθη: ὁ δὲ δὴ 
Σενέκας ὁ Ἀνναῖος  ὁ Λούκιος, ὁ πάντας μὲν τοὺς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν Ῥωμαίους πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ἄλλους σοφίᾳ ὑπεράρας, 
διεφθάρη παρ᾽ ὀλίγον μήτ᾽ ἀδικήσας τι μήτε δόξας, ὅτι δίκην τινὰ ἐν. (“On the one hand, he no longer estimated 
Domitius to be considered [so] terrible; on the other hand, though, [there was] Lucius Annaeus Seneca, [who] of his 
own merits utterly surpassed all those touting wisdom, as well as many other Romans, besides. For this reason, with 
such a standard set, he neither was nor was expected to be comparable to one of a lower station.”)—Historiae 
Romanae LIX.xix.vii 
13 See Duff 161 
14 Op. cit. 162  
4 
 
 Before his banishment, Seneca had cultivated quite a literary reputation at Rome. Taking 
this under consideration, Agrippina thought it advantageous to commission him as a tutor for her 
son, the would-be emperor, Nero. Upon his return, the empress enlisted Seneca, along with 
praetorian prefect Afranius Burrus, to attend to the young boy’s schooling. Together with his co-
educator, Seneca instructed Nero in the widest array of subjects accessible; yet, there were 
purportedly two areas of study in which the prince was forbidden to partake. The first was 
actually that of philosophy, for Agrippina found it ill-befitting an imminent Roman ruler to waste 
time in this manner. The second curricular limitation was set by Seneca himself. He refused to 
instruct Nero in the ways of the older orators in an effort to promote his more modern approach 
to the subject, or, as Suetonius reports, a cognitione ueterum oratorum Seneca praeceptor, quo 
diutius in admiratione sui detineret (“Seneca, as instructor, detained [Nero] as long as possible 
from knowledge of the old orators in admiration of himself.”).15 At any rate, under the watchful 
eyes and careful guidance of Seneca and Burrus, the power behind Nero’s throne would bring 
about a time of tranquility following the death of Claudius in 54. In the five years that followed, 
the two instructors managed to maintain a steady course for their pupil, and the relatively 
temperate sociopolitical climate provided during this quinquennium would even be admired 
decades later by another Roman emperor.16 In the course of this span of time, Seneca ascended 
to the height of his political potential, and comrades and critics alike would praise him, along 
with Burrus, for the direction in which the state seemed to be headed at the time. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
15 De uitis Caesarum: Vita Neronis lii 
16 The emperor Trajan reportedly lauded the accession of Nero to such a degree that he even held the leadership 
during this brief period in Roman history in higher esteem than that found in the Republican era: Qui cum longe 
adolescens dominatum parem annis vitrico gessisset, quinquennium tamen tantus fuit, augenda urbe maxime, uti 
merito Traianus saepius testaretur procul differre cunctos principes Neronis quinquennio...(“Who, for a long while 
when he was a young man, ruled over a domain paralleled in the years of his stepfather (Claudius); nevertheless, 
there was such a wonderful period of five years, during which the city was chiefly increased, leading Trajan to 
proclaim rather frequently the all the other leaders of Rome combined were by far deficient [compared to] the 
quinquennium of Nero.”) —Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus v 
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Nero never fully committed himself to the decent disposition that his mentors would have him 
display. The situation was already deteriorating around the time of Agrippina’s death in 59 at her 
son’s command, but things quickly became unsalvageable after the passing of Burrus in 62. 
 For Seneca, remaining in a court or in any capacity on behalf of which his efforts were 
ineffectual was a direct affront to his conception of the ability of the Stoic sapiens to recognize 
his loss of influence and to subsequently remove himself from the equation:  si res publica 
corruptior est quam adiuari possit, si occupata est malis, non nitetur sapiens in 
superuacuum …(“If the Repbulic is more corrupt than can be helped, if it is overrun with evils, 
the wise man will not strive on in superfluity.”).17 Ofonius Tigellinus, the replacement for Burrus 
as chief of the Praetorian Guard, along with the emperor’s wife Poppaea, stalwartly opposed 
Seneca in his role as advisor to Nero. Consequently, also in 62, Seneca submitted to the emperor 
his request for retirement and withdrew to his studies. Suspicious gazes would follow him now 
into this self-imposed exile, however, and he was eventually implicated in the Pisonian 
Conspiracy of April 65. Following an indictment on the charge of conspiracy, Seneca, like his 
nephew Lucan, was forced by order of Nero to commit suicide at his home later that year, and it 
is Tacitus who provides us with the most famous account of his death in the penultimate extant 
book of his Annales (XV.lxi-lxiv). 
His Works and Style 
 
 The Senecan corpus is vast and varied. He devoted himself to literary endeavors ranging 
in genre from the epistolary to the poetic and beyond. Unfortunately, though, several works are 
lost to us, and many of those that are extant are difficult to date conclusively. Among Seneca’s 
writings that have disappeared are anthologies of discourses and poetry, a biography of his father, 
a treatise on physics (De motu terrarum), as well as one on the religious practices of Egypt (De 
                                                             
17 Seneca, De otio iii 
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ritu et sacris Aegyptiorum), various other geographic and ethnographic works, the Moralis 
Philosophiae Libri, and at least two of the books comprising the Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium. 
The surviving works include the posthumously collected and christened Dialogi, twelve treatises 
primarily focused on philosophical and ethical issues, among which the Ad Serenum de otio (viii) 
and the Ad Paulinum de breuitate uitae (x) rank.18 The seven books De benificiis, the De 
clementia (addressed to Nero), 124 Epistulae Morales, nine cothurnatae tragedies19, the Ludus 
de Morte Claudii (Apocolocyntosis), and the Naturales Quaestiones in seven, or maybe 
originally eight, books. 
 Regardless of genre, the works of Seneca that remain—if not overtly philosophical in 
nature—all possess an underlying characteristic of similar cogency and meticulous attention to 
personal examination. This distinguishing mark of his work results of course from the author’s 
known penchant for such a contemplative milieu, but his other training was also put to use in the 
construction of these works. Owing to the extensive education Seneca received in rhetoric, his 
style may be considered “disconnected, pointed, antithetic, metaphorical and piquant.”20 The 
convergence, then, of Seneca sapiens and Seneca rhetor21 imbues his products with the ability to 
express philosophical concepts within the confines of carefully crafted rhetorical discourse—an 
achievement perhaps attained to such an extent previously in Roman literature only by Cicero. 
However, in terms of their identities as writers, similarities between Seneca and his Republican 
predecessor stop there. Duff notes that “[i]t is clear to a lover of Cicero’s polished amplitude will 
                                                             
18 The remaining books of the Dialogi are arranged as follows: i, Ad Lucilium de prouidentia; ii, Ad Serenum de 
constantia sapientis; iii-v, Ad Nouatum de ira libri III; vi, Ad Marciam de consolatione; vii, Ad Gallionem de uita 
beata; ix, Ad Serenum de tranquilitate animi; xi, Ad Polybium de consolatione; xii, Ad Heluiam matrem de 
consolatione. 
19 Ordered as they appear in the Etruscus manuscript the tragedies are as follows—Hercules Furens, Troades, 
Phoenissae, Medea, Phaedra, Oedipus, Agamemnon, Thyestes, and Hercules Oetaeus. 
20 Duff 160 
21 Not to be confused with the appellation granted to Seneca’s father by later scholars. For more on this term as it is 
applied to the Elder Seneca, see Bloomer 115. 
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not feel drawn to the Senecan sentence which, by comparison, must appear offhand, and, despite 
frequent use of pointed balance, to a large extent formless.”22 Although I would disagree with 
Duff’s assertion that Seneca’s work is without coherent structure (De otio offers, for instance, an 
example of ring composition comparable to the Thucydidean juxtaposition of Perikles’ Funeral 
Oration and the narrative of the Plague of Athens.), it is quite noticeable that Seneca departs 
from traditionally accepted modes of expression when producing his works. In lieu of Ciceronian 
eloquentia, Seneca chooses Stoic breuitas. Instead of employing a register of language 
inaccessible to some, Seneca’s works are characteristically lined with colloquialisms, common 
idiomatic expressions, and references and wordplay immediately accessible to the addressee.23 
Because he is guilty of transgression against a proper Latin style that Cicero in large part 
established and ossified, such critics as Quintilian24—a noted proponent of Ciceronian style—
and Fronto25—an antiquarian writing in the century following the time of Seneca—malign him 
harshly as a writer. However, there were still those in antiquity who recognized his genius. 
Among them was Tacitus, who noticed in Senecan style an aspect that is highly pertinent to the 
task at hand:  fuit illi uiro (Senecae) ingenium amoenum et temporis eius auribus accommodatum 
(“There was for that man (Seneca) an innate talent agreeable and accommodating to the ears of 
his day.”).26  
 Despite any praise or condemnation, however, the fact yet remains that Seneca’s style has 
its share of complexities and inconsistencies. He does not choose to adhere to a universal model 
                                                             
22 Duff 184 
23 For instance, consider Seneca’s analogy of taking stock of one’s life compared to accounting for the grain supply 
at De breu. XVIII, which was addressed to the current praefectus annonae. 
24 Ex industria Senecam in omni genere eloquentiae distuli, propter uulgatam falso de me opinionem qua damnare 
eum et inuisum quoque habere sum creditus (“Out of due diligence, I have defamed Seneca in all manner of 
eloquence, due to a rumor spuriously circulated concerning me, I am thought to condemn him, as well as even to 
consider him detestable.”)—Institutio oratoria X.i.cxxv. 
25 Fronto referred to Senecan phrases as Senecae mollibus et febriculosis prunuleis (“Seneca’s soft little cough-
inducing prunes”) in his Ad M. Antonium de orationibus liber (I.ii). 
26 Annales XIII.iii 
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that he applies to all of his works; rather, his variations appear to attempt to capture the character 
of each individual instance of writing. Even though Seneca strives to operate within the realm of 
“popular” speech, there is an inescapable artificiality of language inherent in the production of 
literature as opposed to the infrequency with which we find it in quotidian oral exchange.   
Ultimately, though, if we are to concur with Duff, we may find that “…perhaps it is more 
profitable to ask whether, with his style, [Seneca] fulfilled his main object in writing.”27 So, now 
we are left with the question of what that “main object” may have been. Returning once more to 
Duff, he finds that Seneca “…had to face the fresh problem of composing readable tracts on 
ethical questions mainly Stoic…,”28 and it is this task of tailoring his literature to a purely 
Roman audience that I posit was of a primary concern for Seneca and which forms the 
foundation of this thesis. 
On the Project 
Overview 
 In this work, I will be primarily concerned with the examination of two of Seneca’s 
Dialogi—Ad Serenum de otio and Ad Paulinum de breuitate uitae—in an effort to demonstrate 
the importance the author places on appealing “to the ears of his time.” Provided the harmonious 
theme and genre of these two treatises, I hope to avoid questions of style that could pertain to 
either of these two aspects of the works so that I may focus my attention specifically on the ways 
in which the style in them reflects the author’s plea to purely Latin sensibilities. Secondarily, I 
also hope that, through this pointed literary exercise, I perhaps will be able to contribute in some 
way to the rehabilitation of Seneca as a preeminent author in his nation’s heritage and of his 
era’s Latin as a means of Roman expression every bit as effective and worthy of study as the 
works of Cicero or Virgil. 
                                                             
27 Duff 184 
28 Ibid. 
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 The overarching impetus behind this thesis is an investigation of two of Seneca’s Dialogi 
in an effort to demonstrate how I have found the author to be expressive of a purely Roman 
character in the execution of his writings in Latin. As the work progresses, I will be examining 
four different words or concepts in order to illuminate those aspects that Seneca would find 
“obscene” or a general affront to Roman sentiments in order to demonstrate the author’s 
culturally-attuned pen. In the first chapter, we will take a look at the problematic idea of 
“philosophy” and how it serves as the foundation for the issues that arise in the subsequent 
chapters. In Chapter II, “preoccupation” will serve as the focal point, and we will discuss the 
manners in which diversionary activities rob not only the sapiens, but also the common Roman 
citizen of his life and essence. The final chapter will be devoted to the exploration of “numbness” 
and “inexperience” as perilous obstacles to sapientia, as well as to an empire mired in its own 
decadence. 
Brief Notes on the Texts 
Ad Serenum de otio 
 It is commonly agreed upon that the addressee of Seneca’s treatise On Leisure is Annaeus 
Serenus, Nero’s prefect of the watch. Several issues, however, including a missing opening 
sentence and an absence of any referential matter throughout the work, make it difficult to 
substantiate conclusively claims to Seneca’s correspondent. Consequently, definitively dating the 
work also presents its difficulties; nevertheless, provided that conjectures concerning Serenus’ 
identity are correct, scholars tend to agree that 63 is the very latest date that it could have been 
produced. 
 Listed as eighth in the catalogue of Dialogi, De otio broaches the subject of the Stoic 
ideal of leisure and to what effect it should be obtained. Here, Seneca speaks out in protest of a 
conception of leisure that is idle (iners negotium) in favor of an enlivened retreat from the 
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fastidious in the course of which the sapiens may have time to enjoy the rewards of 
contemplation and subsequent action. 
Ad Paulinum de breuitate uitae 
 Although almost certainly written prior to its counterpart mentioned above, this treatise 
Concerning the Brevity of Life appears as tenth in the canon of Sencan Dialogi. Addressed to the 
praefectus annonae and eques from Arelate, Pompeius Paulinus, it must have been produced 
some time between 48 and 55 C.E.  
 The thematic similarities between De otio and De breuitate uitae are many, with their 
primary concerns focused on the manners in which people permit their schedules and other 
diversions to restrict their movement through life. With the absence of this vital mobility, the 
victims become unaware of the passage of time and thus curse the temporal nuisance as the 
responsible party to their own inefficiencies. 
Sources 
 J. Wight Duff is certainly not wrong when he proclaims “[t]he jungle of literature which 
has grown up around Seneca testifies to the manifold inquiries stimulated by his personality and 
works. The bare enumeration of representative treatises or essays on Senecan subjects becomes 
oppressive.”29 However, with Duff’s metaphor, let us also be mindful of a likewise sylvan adage 
that admonishes against loss of perspective. Though many and varied, available sources on 
Seneca do not often speak to the author specifically as a conservator of Romanity as I will here 
postulate; therefore, secondary documentation on the subject may appear sparse at times. 
 Of the ancients, Tacitus, Suetonius, Cassius Dio, and Seneca himself offer us the most 
complete biographical portraits of the author, and their resources are used gratuitously 
throughout. In terms of contemporary secondary scholarship on the philosopher and his work, I 
                                                             
29 Op. cit. 159 
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have made it a careful effort to include as many sources as possible that could offer any credence 
to my arguments. In general, the works of Conte, Williams, Duff, and Long will serve as the 
principal source material for citations and general information. 
Initial Difficulties:  Paucity of Language and the Validity of the Latin Literary Tradition 
Nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta 
  difficile inlustrare Latinis uersibus esse, 
  multa nouis uerbis praesertim cum sit agendum 
  propter egestatem linguae et rerum nouitatem... 
       
  “Neither does it escape me, [a man] of intellect, that it is difficult 
   to capture the obscure inventions of the Greeks in Latin verses, 
  especially when many must be delineated by means of new words 
  due to the poverty of language and the novelty of things…” 
—Lucretius, De rerum natura I.cxxxvi-cxxxix 
 
 The opinion posited above is one that is actually quite pervasive throughout the 
Republican era of Rome, a period during which the growing expanse of her holdings and 
influence forced the social elite of the city to form an appraisal of their place among the rich 
cultural accomplishments found throughout the Mediterranean.  For centuries, Greek ideas and 
various modes of thought had been proliferated in this region and beyond by the sprawling 
effects of hegemonic domination seen in the ever-expanding hellenephonic world.  Even 
following the death of Alexander and the division of his empire, the lands that had succumbed to 
his campaign felt no dissipation of Greek cultural influence, for it had become so imbedded in 
societies throughout the eastern stretches of the known world. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of 
the Italian peninsula also witnessed this force.  Greek was the lingua franca of commerce, of 
culture, and, most importantly for our consideration, of education. Latin, even after those who 
held her as their native tongue conquered the reaches of the East formerly held under Greek 
dominion, would never there become more than the language of governmental operation.  This 
12 
 
sentiment toward Greek linguistic authority was found not only in the provinces, but also at 
home among the Roman working classes who relied on a pragmatic grasp of the language for 
trade purposes, as well as with the aristocracy who viewed Greek as “‘the other’ Roman 
language alongside Latin...”30 
 The question of lingual dominance becomes an entirely different one, though, when we 
consider the evaluation of literature. To help place things in perspective, Bloomer reminds us 
that “[a]t the very time Greek scholars in Alexandria and Pergamum were editing Homer and 
reflecting, both in theoretical fashion and poetic works, on the nature of language and the 
essential differences of literary language, the Romans had no ‘literature.’ This alone makes the 
Roman invention of a native style more problematic than the Hellenistic creation of a Greek one 
had been.”31 Now we see that it not really even a matter of dominance at all, but rather one of the 
mere existence of a Latin literary identity. It would seem that the time-honored Greek tradition 
and its expansive following proved daunting even to some who would make lasting contributions 
to the Latin corpus. The playwright Terence thus expresses his sentiments on the issue:    
Tum si quis est qui dictum in se inclementius 
  existumauit esse, sic existumet 
  responsum non dictum esse, quia laesit prior; 
  qui bene uortendo et easdem scribendo male ex 
  Graecis bonis Latinas fecit non bonas. 
 
  “Then, if there is anyone who has quite harshly found 
 there to be a remark against him, thus is the response— 
 there is no remark, because the ancestors have struck the blow; 
Those who, in transforming well and writing the same products poorly,  
[could] not fashion Latin treasures from those of the Greeks.” 
—Eunuchus iv-viii 
 
                                                             
30 Clackson and Horrocks 2007: For more on the wide-spread influence of Greek on Roman linguistic practices, 
both at home and abroad, see Chapter III of The Blackwell History of the Latin Language.   
31 Bloomer 3 
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Of course, Terence is writing in a genre which owes heavily its origins to Greek comedy, making 
some hesitancy on his behalf understandable. Nevertheless, it is actually the fortuitous product of 
Roman comedic adaptation that “Latin was secure as the prestige language of Italy, and good 
Latin had been nicely distinguished from bad…” by the time of Terence’s supposed death in 159 
B.C.E.32 What, then, would compel him, Lucretius, or others like them to judge the applicability 
of the Latin language to verse composition in such a manner? With a cursory glance, we will 
notice that the two passages recently cited from Lucretius and Terence are poetry, with many of 
their prosodic elements being inherited from the Greeks. However, it would not be until Ennius’ 
credited introduction of the hexameter in the late third century B.C.E. that Greek versification 
would become an issue. In fact, when translating the Odyssey, Livius Andronicus—the first 
extant producer of Latin literature—chose to do so in saturnians, and Naevius also selected this 
meter to compose his epic, Bellum Poenicum. It should make little sense, then, to suppose that 
later writers of poetry would feel any compunction to adhere to a Greek model for the production 
of their art, which leads us to the question of what is actually being praised in their works.  
For Cato the Elder, the message is not so oblique. Considered the father of Latin prose 
literature,33 Cato is not concerned with the Graicorum obscura reperta or the Graecis bonis, but 
rather with the extension of Roman hegemony. For this reason, he maligns the tribune Marcus 
Caelius for “…bursting into song, performing Greek verses, and telling jokes.”34 The charges 
brought against Caelius are those of engaging in distinctly non-Roman behavior, highlighted by 
the inclusion of the performance of Greek material among them. For all that the Romans 
culturally owe to the Greeks, as well as to others amid the conquered, the primary objective was 
always the edification of Rome. Therefore, it should be no surprise that any assimilation or 
                                                             
32 Habinek 44 
33 Op. cit. 38 
34 Op. cit. 42 
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absorption on behalf Rome would be taken on solely in the interest of bringing the world of her 
empire into herself—an example of evolution at its finest as the culture bent on domination 
envelops and manipulates its acquisitions to ensure their continued subjugation. In short, the 
Romans were able to perpetuate their own sovereignty by incorporating the cultures they had 
conquered into their own while yet maintaining stark distinctions between themselves and 
outsiders35. And so a sense of Latinity is born. Embracing the Roman quest for superiority, 
Latinity evolves as a competitive response:  “[a]s a legacy from the Hellenistic world, strictures 
about style and proper language in Rome can be seen as a translation of a process of cultural 
rivalry…”36 Nevertheless, the ways in which Latin literature manifests its influence in Roman 
society are markedly different from those that characterize Greek (particularly Hellenistic) and 
its meaning to hellenophones. It maintains the comparable traits of grammatical rigidity and 
verbal and syntactical exclusivity, but the resulting experience for the reader of Latin differs 
from that of the Greek reader inasmuch as one who would engage in the reading of Greek feels 
neither compelled nor encouraged to consider himself as belonging to a shared cultural identity, 
especially considering the extensive and broadly socially varied territories the Greek-speaking 
world encompassed. Out of initial isolation and then antagonism develops a type of cultural 
solidarity among readers of Latin—“Within Roman literature claims to an authenticating style 
structure and reinforce the ambitious status of literature:  the text promises that it confers 
Romanness.”37 
 For all their literary progress, however, Latin authors seemed to have relegated one genre 
permanently to Greek papyri:  philosophy. It is such aristocrats and champions of Latin letters as 
                                                             
35 This cultural identity will become a serious issue for many Romans by the time of the fall of the eastern Empire in 
the fourth century C.E.; however, the statement above still maintains for Seneca and those of his generation.  
36 Bloomer 5 
37 Op. cit. 6 
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Lucretius or Cicero who take the idea even further, confessing difficulties with Latin expression 
of this field that was (and, to some extent, still is) held as predominantly Greek. Epic, history, 
ethnography, and even comedy had felt the impression of Roman influence and innovation, but 
philosophy, for reasons both linguistic and cultural, would remain the province of the Greek 
tongue for some time. 
Seneca the Innovator 
Stoicism, a philosophical system endowed with an allure to the disenfranchised and a 
cosmopolitan worldview, fundamentally recognized no distinctions of class, station, or 
nationality. As a result, it becomes the perfect vehicle for bridging the gap perceived between 
Greek philosophical discourse and the ability of Latin to convey it in the hands of Seneca, 
perhaps one of Rome’s most avid acolytes of Stoicism. Despite such intrinsic cultural mobility, 
however, Seneca needs still extend the boundaries of Roman literature38 in order to 
accommodate his ethical project. As if on a mission to renovate conceptions of Latin’s semantic 
scope, Seneca devises the Latin philosophical essay and letter.39 Of the 145 extant Senecan 
works, 124 of them belong to the latter genre of his own invention, leaving only fifteen percent 
of the remainder of his life’s work devoted to other modes of literature. In contriving the 
structure of his clearly favored medium, Seneca most likely relied on Plato and Epicurus (in 
                                                             
38 The extension is truly one of the scope of the Latin tongue as it now, in the hands of Seneca, can apparently 
express complex and innovative philosophical concepts in a manner that is strictly bound by Roman vocabulary. 
Unlike his predecessors and some of his contemporaries he finds it completely feasible to explore the bounds of 
philosophical exercise in Latin and accordingly he affects the language in a way that is certainly noticeable: “When 
Cicero wrote philosophy, he created a basic Latin vocabulary for the expression of Greek philosophical ideas. This 
vocabulary was foundational for later attempts to write philosophical works in Latin, though it was certainly not 
final or determinative. When we read Cicero, we can almost always do so against the background of our knowledge 
of the kind of Greek philosophy and terminology which he faced. As a result of this, and because he wrote for the 
most part to bring Greek philosophical ideas to his Roman audience, we can usually read through his Latin 
terminology to see the Greek…In Seneca things are different. Despite a smattering of technical terms which he 
deliberately introduces from Greek…we find little…What this shows about Seneca’s attitude to writing philosophy 
in Latin is simple: that he prefers to work his ideas out in Latin, in Latin terms, because that is the language he 
thinks in. Seneca, much more than Cicero, is thinking creatively and philosophically in Latin” (Inwood 73-74). 
39 See Duff 184 
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particular) to act as models40. As a consequence, he is writing letters in a manner with which his 
fellow Romans are yet unfamiliar, but this serves as no indication that he has strayed from his 
endeavor to produce material perfectly compatible with the sensibilities of the Quirites. Quite the 
contrary, in fact. By siring the Latin philosophical letter, Seneca is able to adapt the rich Roman 
history of letter-writing to fit his didactic aims, creating a medium through which he may more 
effectively convey his messages to a Roman readership. The efficacy of this material one finds in 
the personable (yet instructive) character Seneca hopes to achieve: 
Taking up a topos that is very common in ancient epistologography, Seneca emphasizes that epistolary 
exchange makes it possible to hold a colloquium with the friend, to create with him an intimacy that, by 
being a direct example of life, shows itself to be pedagogically more effective than doctrinal instruction. 
More than the other genres of philosophical literature, the letter is close to the reality of ordinary life, from 
which it picks up various elements, using them as points of departure for moral considerations and so 
lending itself perfectly to the daily practice of philosophy. 41 
 
With this in mind, one may be tempted to ask why it is, then, that I have decided to focus 
on De otio and De breuitate uitae, two of Seneca’s Dialogi. The answer to such an inquiry lies 
within the uncanny similarity between the letter and Seneca’s particular brand of dialogue. The 
Platonic precursors to the Senecan examples typically contain Socrates as the primary 
conversationalist, along with one or more persons with whom he is engaged in seeking out the 
roots of the philosophical precept or problem in question by means of intimate discussion. 
However, although Plato’s dialogues may be reflective of a colloquium real or imagined, they are 
entirely in the third-person realm where the reader may only observe from afar the philosophical 
processes at work. Seneca on the other hand chooses to take on the role of sage for himself and 
engages his addressees as the interlocutors of his dialectic. Although they are corporeally absent, 
Seneca provides these comrades in conversation with a voice that is distinctly their own when he 
often raises and addresses issues conceivably held by his correspondents. It is transgression 
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41 Ibid. 
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against this Platonic form that has engendered some reticence to designate Seneca’s works as 
bona fide dialogues,42 and I have my own doubts concerning such an appellation. Yet it is also 
this affront to convention that borrows for Seneca the most crucial aspects of the Roman letter—
namely, those personal, organic, and familiar as opposed to the detached, artificial, and foreign 
character of much previous philosophy—for use in his repurposing of an established Greek genre. 
In the dialogues of Seneca, the reader is the one who is truly most involved with the writer, and it 
is this characteristic that most resembles the format of dialogue. With such a stylistic choice, 
what Seneca has created certainly appears to be a dialogue in the sense that it is a conversation 
between two people, only they are separated by space and time. Due to this separation, the 
dialogi then become much more similar to the epistolary tradition, making it considerably more 
apt to see these works not as dialogues, the designation of which evokes such a standoffish 
Platonic image as we discussed recently, but rather as letters. And these letters can be said to be 
addressed to and for the edification of each individual who has ever read or who will ever read 
these Senecan masterpieces as though each one of us could cultivate a relationship as intimate as 
that which he shared with Lucilius. 
 As we turn now to the opening chapter of this work, let us be reminded of our title. It is, 
of course, an allusion to a most famous speech rendered on the lips of Marc Antony to a crowd 
of funerary onlookers in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Given the renown of these words, I do not 
feel it necessary to repeat them here because we are well aware whom the speaker is addressing. 
And so it is for Seneca. Letters and treatises written for the eyes of friends were also composed 
for the betterment of his countrymen, for his Romans. However, in applying this particular 
address to Seneca, we must first consider the request. By asking for the audience’s attention in 
                                                             
42 Williams also suggests that “[a] more promising explanation for the title [of Seneca’s collection of ethical treatises] 
is that it refers to dialogus in the technical rhetorical sense of a branch of the figure prosopopoeia, i.e. words 
attributed to a definite or indefinite speaker” (4). 
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such a manner, Antony, or perhaps even the Bard himself, has forgotten one crucial detail:  
communication. And, in order to truly commune with one’s audience, he or she must have the 
most intimate understanding of the interlaced nuances of culture and language. An understanding 
that I hope I will prove throughout the course of this thesis was firmly in the possession of 
Seneca the Younger. So, as we look now to the evidence that I have compiled to substantiate this 
claim, let us first agree that a listening ear as Antony would have is but a small part of reception. 
For, what is there for ears to receive if there is no voice to fill them? 
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CHAPTER I: “PHILOSOPHY” 
Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. 
“The mountains will be in labor; a ridiculous mouse will be birthed.” 
—Horace, Ars Poetica cxxxix 
In this first chapter, we will explore the notion of “philosophy” as it provides definite 
impediments to the Senecan agenda. Now, before any dispersions can be cast on the fact that 
Seneca himself is enrolled amongst the philosophers of Rome, we must understand that our 
conception of the term has had numerous centuries to evolve into what we label “philosophy.” 
For this reason, I have deemed it necessary to concern the opening of the chapter with the 
distinction of what exactly is meant when the word appears here. For the remainder of the 
chapter, we will explore how Seneca expresses his distaste for the subject, bringing into focus his 
deconstruction of philosophical exercise and his separatist stance not only toward the infection of 
harmful Greek influence in Roman society, but also toward philosophical schools in general, as 
well as even toward earlier Roman philosophical endeavor. 
In order to understand Seneca’s attitude toward “philosophy,” we must first distinguish 
what exactly we mean by the term. That is not to say that I will now embark upon some frivolous 
and exhausting lexical excursion. Instead, I intend to illuminate precisely how we are to handle 
the phraseology of our discussion henceforth. Perhaps risking the same error in judgment that 
befell his predecessors with the present analysis of my own native tongue, I nonetheless find it 
difficult to convey in English the notion of “the love, study, or pursuit of wisdom, or of 
knowledge of things and their causes, whether theoretical or practical”43 without usage of the 
word “philosophy.” What was once a narrower term, even as late as the Middle Ages, is now 
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employed rather extensively to describe anything from the formalized study of ideas to one’s 
own personal opinion. For this reason, “philosophy” cannot mean the same for us as philosophia 
would have for Seneca, and it is not even the Latin word, per se, that proves to be problematic 
for him. Philosophia is only troublesome inasmuch as it is a derivative of φιλοσοφία—a word 
Greek not only in origin but also (if not wholly Athenian) in character. Throughout the course of 
the matter now at hand, it will be safe to assume that any appearance of “philosophy” will 
actually be in reference to this word and the connotations it holds.  
Continuing henceforth, we must discern why φιλοσοφία is such an obscene concept for 
Seneca. The very foreign nature of the word plays a role in making it problematic, and we will 
discuss this issue momentarily. However, for now, let us examine some of the contrasting 
philological characteristics between φιλοσοφία, an admittedly general and certainly ethereal term, 
and the pinnacle of Roman Stoic aspiration:  sapientia. First of all, what we find in the word 
φιλοσοφία is a term that allows for the existence of wisdom independent from that of the 
philosopher. For those engaged in the practice of φιλοσοφία, then, that wisdom—the obvious 
object of their cerebral affections—becomes indelibly separate. And the key to understanding 
this problem lies in an observation I have just made. If the philosopher thus objectifies σοφία, 
causing it to become something disconnected from his being, he must always be in search of it. 
Now, the relative ease or difficulty with which each person finds σοφία is of course variable, but 
not at the heart of the matter itself. On a fundamental level, the dilemma arises from the very fact 
that σοφία and the philosopher share such a relationship as pursuant and prey. Because they 
cannot be efficiently integrated as a single unit, the value of σοφία begins to diminish. While it is 
true that the philosopher can apply all the principles and precepts of σοφία to his life, there is no 
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tangible presence for him. And so the philosopher must ever be concerned with ensuring that he 
is engaged in those practices that permit him access to that which he seeks. 
On the other hand, we find that sapientia, as well as those who would search for it, exist 
not exclusively of one another, but in a symbiotic continuum. Both philologically and practically, 
sapientia presupposes the presence of the one in search of it. The present active participle of 
sapio forms not only the stem of this term, but it also serves as the designation forever conferred 
on a member of the Roman branch of Stoicism: the sapiens. So, we see here in the interrelation 
between sapientia and the sapiens quite the reverse of that between σοφία and the philosophus. 
If the sapiens were not present in the world, then, on a very real level linguistically, sapientia 
would not exist. Likewise, if there were no experiences and observed situations (sapientia), then 
there would be no one (sapiens) living said experiences and simultaneously creating them. The 
sapiens-sapientia relationship is one in which form is perfectly married to function, as opposed 
to one in which the function is in a state of constant flux in order to come to terms with the form. 
Already latent in what I would call the Roman cultural genetics is an expression of the tendency 
toward practicality and pervasive usefulness and the rejection of things frivolous, foreign, and 
fortuitous,44 so we should have no difficulty in availing this model of wisdom and practitioner to 
a Roman public. In fact, what we find is that it fits perfectly the preexisting tropes of Roman 
society; therefore, when Seneca speaks of the Stoic sapiens, he has accessed the cultural lexicon 
and has reintroduced his audience to a character with whom they are already quite familiar.   
Another equally important trouble with φιλοσοφία can be found in the fact that it is 
indeed Greek, and this fact begins to illustrate the difficulty that it would face as part of Seneca's 
verbal and conceptual repertoires. This is because φιλοσοφία at least partially alludes to a 
                                                             
44 For more on the Roman “national self-image” and its proclivity toward discipline and autonomy see Shelton’s 
introduction. Also, we find here a comparison relevant to our discussion concerning the barriers between Greek and 
Roman ideologies in Shelton’s analysis of Ulysses and the Roman hero, Horatius. 
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segregation (here a linguistic one) that he would be hard pressed to legitimize in his particular 
way of thinking. It is the very idea of separation that leads to the fracturing of any collection of 
people, and Seneca has certainly more than one prime example of the chaos—the utter absence 
of reason and restraint so crucial to his ethical project—that ensues whenever factions are set at 
odds. These exempla are provided him via the often sordid sociopolitical history of Rome to that 
point, as well as by his own contemporaneous cultural climate.45 It is such unitary deterioration 
that is often a product of the discord that arises amongst acolytes of a given school of philosophy 
and which Seneca hopes to avoid, for it in no way provides the requisite environment for the 
"superior detachment of the sage from earthly contingencies.”46 Therefore, how are we to avoid 
such collective disagreements? Succinctly, by eliminating the collectives. Although Seneca is 
universally acknowledged as a Stoic philosopher, nowhere in De otio or De breuitate uitae does 
he explicitly refer to himself as such.47  Instead, he works to create quite a contrary impression:  
he belongs to all and to none of the philosophical schools prevalent in his day. In the beginning 
of De otio, the jibing interlocutor attempts to link him to the Stoics, referring to them as Stoici 
uestri;48 however, Seneca refuses even to hint as to where his allegiances lie. His short yet 
effective response to his critic's attempt to subvert his stalwart position on the matter ends with a 
                                                             
45 The conditions at Rome were such that people were in desperate search of means of expression for their 
discontent with the principate, so an effigy of Republican sentiment was eventually erected in the character of Cato 
the Younger. This statesman “becomes extremely important in the ideological and literary debates that thrived in 
Neronian salons and contemporary publications” (Sullivan 118). Sullivan also notes here that the anxiety felt by the 
public of the Neronian period enabled them to turn a blind eye to many vices of which Cato was guilty that would 
have formerly engendered considerable social discomfort, and this dismissal only demonstrates more crucially for 
me the level of sociopolitical disintegration apparent in Rome due to the willingness of some its citizens to sacrifice 
widely held mores for the comfort they could extract from a decidedly tarnished symbol of Republican peace, 
prosperity, and “normalcy.” Luckily for Seneca, however, Cato was also a Stoic of some renown, which would 
enable the Neronian author to build his arguments on a platform to which his Roman audience of the day would 
have been more receptive.       
46 Conte 412 
47 The interlocutor’s continued allusion to Seneca’s Stoic inclinations, as well as the author’s own frequent return to 
Stoic subjects imply Seneca’s connections to the discipline and illustrate his intimate familiarity with the school of 
thought, but they are not permitted to affix the title of “Stoic” to Seneca outright. 
48 De ot. I.iv 
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poignant exposition of Seneca's opinion on the indoctrination that was too often for him a result 
of the pandering of various members of the philosophical schools:  non quo miserint me illi, sed 
quo duxerint ibo.49 Throughout the remainder of De otio and in De breuitate uitae, Seneca 
continuously refers to the Stoic school of philosophy itself. Additionally, even more remote from 
the author are the founders of Stoicism, Zeno and Chrysippos, whom he conjures on more than 
one occasion to display his complete detachment from them and the edifice that has been 
constructed on the foundations they prepared. 
If Seneca is this overtly dissociative even from the school that proved to be so influential 
for him, then his reaction to the remainder of the philosophical world should be even more 
standoffish. Although subtle to our eyes, perhaps, his disdain for φιλοσοφία lacks no force in 
terms of Roman cultural comprehension. In the fourth chapter of De otio, Seneca produces a 
thought experiment through the consideration of two hypothetical republics. The first is vere 
publica, a truly common or shared political environment in which people are not bounded by 
definite borders, but rather in which they may view a true universal expansiveness reflective of 
Stoic cosmopolitanism.50 The other is one that limits people according to heredity, extending 
liberties only to a chosen few. It is this latter society that he says belongs to Athenians and 
Carthaginians (haec aut Atheniensium erit aut Carthaginiensium, IV.1). On the surface, it is the 
inherent inequality of these societies that earns Seneca's censure; however, the Roman culture 
also contained some discrepancies between classes and other affiliations, even if these 
oligarchical tendencies were often unspoken. Considering, however, that Athens was the cradle 
of philosophy following the ascension of the pre-Socratics, Seneca’s attitude toward the city 
takes on a new texture. It is already clear that he views Athens and cities like it as the antithesis 
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50 For more on the origins of Stoicism and the intrinsic appeal of inclusivity therein, see Shaw’s “The Divine 
Economy: Stoicism as Ideology.” 
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of the ideal Stoic society, but the consideration of Athens as analogous to Carthage contains 
specific relevance to Roman readers. For Romans well aware of their history and tradition, the 
mention of Carthage here could conjure any number of images, from an aged Cato’s impassioned 
calls for the city’s destruction, to the home of an exotic queen whose demise enabled the 
founding of Rome, to comedic fodder for Plautus. At any rate, the correlative biases toward 
anything of the Punic persuasion would be less than positive at Rome, so expressly coupling it 
with the seat of Greek philosophical practice does not come without its miasmatic repercussions.  
If this comparison to one of Rome’s most heinous enemies is not enough to express 
Seneca’s displeasure with philosophical exercise as a product of Greek inheritance, there remains 
his open disapproval of the study of useless matter. Seneca recognizes in contemporary 
pedagogy a problem stemming from the sophistic modes of instruction employed at Rome:  nam 
de illis nemo dubitat quin operose nihil agant qui litterarum inutilium studiis detinentur, quae 
iam apud Romanos quoque magna manus est (“For, concerning those men, no one wonders why 
those who are detained by the studies of useless literariness offer nothing of value—[this trend] 
which is now a great presence even among the Romans.”).51 With this recognition, Seneca has 
revealed to his audience that there is a “great presence” of ineffectual knowledge being 
cultivated in the Rome of his era and he goes even further to illuminate the origins of this threat 
to Roman education. The next sentence following his assessment prominently displays 
Graecorum as its initial word, alerting the reader to the fact that Seneca is now concentrating on 
the Greeks, ostensibly shifting his focus. Nonetheless, he will actually prove to hold Greek 
influence as the cause of the woes he just described. Seneca continues by stating that Graecorum 
iste morbus fuit quarere quem numerum Ulixes remigum habuisset, prior scripta esset Ilias an 
Odyssia, praeterea an eiusdem esset auctoris…(“It was that plague of the Greeks to question the 
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number of rowers Odysseus had, whether the Iliad or the Odyssey was written first, whether the 
author of the former was the same…”).52 First of all, we notice that, instead of a “presence” 
(manus) such as that which exists at Rome, the pedagogical climate that existed among the 
Greeks was a “plague” (morbus). Normally, the fact that Seneca includes the juxtaposition of 
iam and fuit—relying on the perfect system of the verb to demonstrate the detachment from the 
current temporal frame denoted by iam—could alleviate at least partially the culpability of the 
Roman learned class in the crime of propagating erudite frivolities. However, no leniency is 
actually granted when we consider the force of the alliterative terms he uses to describe the 
condition (magna manus…morbus) in conjunction with the appearance of iste morbus. With this 
in mind, the continued, extensive list of studies in which the Greeks were engaged serves as a 
stifled rebuke of the Romans, as well, and it is by means of this reproach that Seneca wishes to 
divert their current educational path away from Greek influence and thus away from distraction. 
In order to display ultimate dominance of the Stoic sapiens over the philosophus, Seneca 
directly engages in semantic combat with one of the few other Roman thinkers to compile their 
thoughts in Latin: M. Tullius Cicero. In the fifth chapter of De breuitate uitae, Cicero is quoted 
as saying moror in Tusculano meo semiliber (I tarry half-free in my Tuscan villa.”).53 Only a 
sentence thence, Seneca then repackages Cicero’s statement in indirect discourse—semiliberum 
se dixit Cicero—which allows us to see via the mirrored placement of semiliber at the end of 
Cicero’s thought and at the beginning of his own that Seneca is preparing to restructure the 
philosopher’s words in an opposing argument. Immediately following the indirect statement, 
Seneca continues—at mehercules numquam sapiens in tam humile nomen procedet, numquam 
semiliber erit…(“But, by the gods, the wise man never goes forth under such a humiliating 
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appellation, he will never be half-free.”).54 G.D. Williams, a commentator on Seneca’s text, finds 
the single appearance of semiliber in the extant works of Cicero to be of particular interest 
considering the varying contexts in which both authors use the word. Williams goes on to 
suggest that Seneca is here interpreting semiliber “in a partisan way,”55 but I find that the 
surrounding Senecan context proves otherwise. We do not have to pore over volumes of material 
in search of various usages of semiliber in order to understand Seneca’s point here. The emphasis 
provided by the anaphoric numquam and semiliber (particularly in combination with one another) 
illustrates rather clearly the distinction Seneca is drawing between the sapiens and the 
philosophus. Where the philosophus (i.e. Cicero) is ostensibly able to operate in gradients and 
degrees, as connoted by the notion of semiliber, the sapiens (i.e. Seneca) permits no such luxury.  
It is this concept of being “half-free” that most solidly illustrates Seneca’s difficulty with 
“philosophy.” Whether it be to a particular ideal or group of proponents, those indentured to the 
pursuit of “philosophy” are indissolubly tethered in some manner. Of course, those with the time 
and resources requisite to engage in such study belong to the upper echelons of society, so it is 
quite safe to say that they would not otherwise be confronted with a loss of liberty. Nevertheless, 
if they are to be given over to the diversions of “philosophy” as opposed to involvement in 
worthwhile endeavors they will, as Seneca has demonstrated, become enslaved to all that such 
entails, effectively surrendering perhaps the most highly valued aspect of Roman society—the 
advantage of a life unfettered.  
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CHAPTER II: “PREOCCUPATION” 
ecce deus ramum Lethaeo rore madentem 
uique soporatum Stygia super utraque quassat 
tempora, cunctantique natantia lumina soluit. 
 
“Behold, the god brandishes the bough dripping 
with Lethaean dew and stupefied by Stygian power 
above either temple, and swimming eyes dissolve to delay.” 
—Virgil, Aeneid V.dcccliv-dccclvi 
 If Seneca is ultimately concerned with ensuring the freedom of his readership, then an 
attack against the evils of a preoccupied psyche is certainly in due order and forms the topic for 
this chapter. As we can see from the previous chapter, “philosophy,” or at least the pursuit of it, 
can definitely be considered a preoccupying force. However, abandonment from the virtue of 
industry seems to oppose rather directly mores fundamental to Roman culture. With this in mind, 
we will examine Seneca’s assessment of the “industry” of his day as he finds it to be one of the 
leading causes in preventing ascension to the ranks of the sapiens. As we see Seneca ostensibly 
undermine the Roman value system, we will eventually come to see how the appropriation of 
one’s time, money, mind, and energy to trivial matters ultimately results in the revocation of 
freedoms that are essential to proper human function—those of mind, will, and expression. 
 The very act of generating an entire treatise dedicated to the notion of otium clearly 
demonstrates that Seneca's conception of “leisure” is a far cry from a descent into mere idleness 
as some may think it to be. In De otio, he poses a very short yet palpable question concerning the 
state of mind in which the sapiens should withdraw into otium. The forthcoming answer is 
equally succinct and direct, telling us exactly what the merits of Stoic leisure are to be:  ut sciat 
se tum quoque ea acturum per quae posteris prosit (“That he then may know himself, as well as 
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those things he plans to do through which he might be of service to posterity.”).56 The manner in 
which Seneca has constructed this reply illuminates the character of otium perhaps even more 
fully than the words themselves could alone. The fact that his answer is fragmentary, evolving a 
purpose clause that is solely dependent on the sentence that precedes it, offers a directness that 
grabs the audience's attention and makes the message inescapably clear. And this is particularly 
so when combined with the force of alliterative dentals (sciat se) and plosives (per...posteris 
prosit). Rather than using ut and the subjunctive to express purpose (sciat), Seneca could have 
just as easily utilized the construction of ad and a gerundive; however, it is the dual appearance 
of the mood expressing purpose and potential (prosit) that embodies the practice of 
contemplation. Perhaps taking advantage of the propensity of the Roman tongue to elide 
successive vowels,57 he perfectly balances the vocalization of ea between quoque and acturum 
respectively, demonstrating rather effectively the ultimately inseparable natures of knowledge 
and action in Seneca's Stoic curriculum. In fact, in his mind, contemplatio is in and of itself an 
action; therefore, the contemplative pursuits of the sapiens cannot ever fully abdicate from actio. 
It is the secession (the verb secedere is a favorite of Seneca's in this dialogue in particular) to 
contemplatio that forms the ultimate goal for the sapiens; however, it is unattainable unless he 
engages in the practice of otium. 
 Once again, we arrive at the conclusion that otium cannot be inherently inert, for it must 
be actively sought and exercised in order for it to be effective. It is our discovery that otium 
operates in the rejection or, at the very least, to the exclusion of such institutions as negotium and 
occupatio that leads to our erroneous preconception which holds the Stoic vacation (uacare is 
                                                             
56 De otio VI.iv 
57 The fact that “Latin hexameter, unlike Greek, poets increasingly aimed at the agreement between the verse rhythm 
and the linguistic accent” may help lend credence to the common practice of elision in Roman speech when we 
consider that elision can affect the manner in which sounds are accented (Allen “Latin pronunciation”). 
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also a favored term for Seneca) to leisure as a descent into inactivity and slothfulness. 
Nevertheless, nothing could be more contradictory. We, even if it does lie in some similarly 
bygone semantic register, like the Romans58 before us find negotium and occupatio to be 
invaluable and worthy social resources, thus my reference to them as “institutions.” Accordingly, 
we feel ill at ease when the value of such perceived industry is drawn into question or otherwise 
compromised. For Seneca, however, the trouble arises from the complacent acceptance of their 
benefits to the individual, as well as to the society at large. He utilizes his audience's deep 
familiarity with the concepts in order to cause “...the normally rather colourless but respectable 
occupatio and negotium [to] become the generic terms for all these despised activities…”59 In 
this way, if Miriam Griffin's assessment of occupatio and negotium stands, Seneca is able to 
draw the stark contrast between impotent preoccupation and the ultimate potential of Stoic 
leisure by using language that had so proliferated the Roman consciousness that it had 
presumably been taken for granted. In so doing, he is able to access some of the more intimate 
relationships between Latin language and Roman culture and carries it even further by bringing 
officium into the equation. At one point, Seneca makes use of asyndeton to demonstrate just how 
inextricably linked to the pursuits of wealth and pleasure he finds the usually honorific titles of 
public office to be. Elsewhere, he draws into question the efficacy of burdening oneself with 
various officia to the point that he has harried himself by day’s end.60 Griffin argues that 
                                                             
58 As in the last chapter, Shelton’s introduction to the traditional Roman mindset can help us understand more fully 
the extent to which these people reportedly considered industry and productivity a cultural virtue. See Note 44 in 
Chapter I. 
59 These “despised activities” are summarized by Griffin as “political life, literary activity, the pursuit of luxury and 
pleasure that constitutes the vulgar otium” (318). 
60 De breu. VII.iv: cum diuitiis officiis uoluptatibus and XIV.iii:  isti qui per officia discursant, qui se aliosque 
inquietant, cum bene insanierint, cum omnium limina cotidie perambulauerint nec ullas apertas fores praeterierint, 
cum per diuerissimas domos meritoriam salutationem circumtulerint, quotum quemque ex tam immensa et uariis 
cupiditatibus districta urge poterunt uidere? 
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“officium with its honourable connotations is transferred to the study of philosophy;” however, 
there is another motivation to use the term that may be even more plausible.61  
 The idea of officium—the concept of performing one’s “duty” or “service”—was one that 
had already been applied colloquially to any number of sexual behaviors, both active and passive 
in nature. However, it is the elder Seneca who tells us of a declaimer’s62 mismanagement of the 
word which led to an expansion of officium’s semantic scope as it simultaneously narrowed its 
common connotative usage.63 If as nothing else, the mention of the orator's faux pas functions as 
a cautionary tale for students of rhetoric concerning the importance of properly selecting and 
arranging one’s diction. It operates in this way inasmuch as the apparently suggestive 
juxtaposition of impudicitia and officium in the speech thereafter renders an “unintentional 
double entendre [that] gave rise in the rhetorical schools to a spate of puns, in which officium at 
one level meant ‘duty,’ but on another ‘homosexual patientia.’”64  
 Having access to his father's anecdote, as well as to his own experiences in the training of 
his youth, the younger Seneca could quite possibly be drawing on the “pathic” sexual 
connotations attached to officium at this point to intentionally equate the subjugation of oneself 
in pointless public offices to the role taken on by a submissive party in a homosexual 
relationship.65 His intention in this particular matter is irrelevant, however, and there is little 
concrete philological proof that Seneca does indeed intend to evoke this imagery in the passages 
                                                             
61 Griffin 318 
62 Adams names the declaimer as Haterius (163). 
63 Memini illum, cum libertinum reum defenderet, cui obiciebatur quod patroni concubinus fuisset, dixisse: 
inpudicitia in ingenuo crimen est, in seruo necessitas, in liberto officium. Res in iocos abiit: ‘non facis mihi officium’ 
et ‘multum ille huic in officiis uersatur.’ Ex eo inpudici et obsceni aliquamdiu officiosi uocitati sunt. (“I remember 
this one freedman, his patron’s catamite, who was called for testimony [and], when he gave [his] account, said 
‘Impudicitia is a crime against nature/one’s child, Necessitas against a slave, Officium against a freedman. The 
matter dissolved into jokes/taunts: ‘Don’t think up a ‘duty’ for me’ and ‘That guy is turned in ‘duty’ many times for 
this one.’ From that point forward, for quite some time, those with responsibilities were called ‘perverse’ and 
‘obscene.’”)—L. Annaeus Seneca senior, Controversiae IV.x 
64 Adams 163 
65 “Pathic” is the term used by Adams to describe such behavior. 
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I have cited in my notes. Nevertheless, whether Seneca meant to conjure these linguistic 
connections in the admittedly euphemistically sensitive minds of his audience or not matters 
little when we consider that merely the appearance of officium provides the possibility that it will 
be interpreted as a pathically sexual label, and interpretation via personal and cultural channels 
cannot be avoided by the author. 
   At any rate, it is clear that Seneca finds these trappings of public life to be no more than 
chronophagic distractions from the true occupation of the sapiens. And it is this conflict between 
otium and the res publica that forms a solid point of unification between De otio and De 
breuitate uitae and proves to be a point of some imaginable contention for Seneca in particular, 
considering his own personal struggles with the ties of public affairs. While the later arrival into 
the public sphere would reflect the concept he is trying to put forth; conversely, his necessarily 
gradual recession from the court of Nero66 would bely personal investment in his own 
argumentation. Nevertheless, Seneca finds it neither demeaning nor detracting to rely on his own 
life's experiences—the sum of all his sapientia—to convey a point of interest, even if the 
example it provides for his audience is a negative one.67 As we discussed in Chapter I, this 
reliance on personal experience is what heavily characterizes Seneca's Stoicism as opposed to 
dependency on philosophical exercises and adages. It would then be paradoxical to consider that 
Seneca actually employs two such proverbial passages in his own work; however, by doing so, 
he draws into focus their inefficacy in conveying the relationship the sapiens should have with 
the res publica.  
                                                             
66 There was much turmoil in the Neronian government around 62, and Seneca had previously tried to retire; 
however, he eventually “saw the loss of his influence as a political adviser and gradually withdrew into private life, 
devoting himself to his studies” as he had wished even before the machinations of Poppaea were an issue (Conte 
408). 
67 Seneca is known to call upon obvious aspects of his own humanity:  his health, his age, his shortcomings, his very 
mortality. In so doing, he is able to establish a connection to his readers that supersedes any offered by hypothetical 
scenarios and theoretical argumentation. 
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 He begins the third chapter of De otio by explaining that there are tenants to two schools 
of thought—Epicureans and Stoics—that have formed theories on otium as it applies to one's 
involvement in public affairs. When addressing these theories, he speaks in the voices of the 
respective founding fathers:  Epicurus ait:  ‘non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens, nisi si quid 
interuenerit’; Zenon ait:  ‘accedet ad rem publicam, nisi si quid impedierit’ (“Epicurus said ‘The 
wise man will not contend with the Republic unless something intervenes;’ Zeno said ‘He will 
approach the matters of State unless something impedes him.’”).68 Given that these are not 
genuine quotations,69 Seneca is able to manipulate them however he chooses. This ability to 
speak through the mouths of Epicurus and Zeno in turn enables him to illustrate the problem that 
arises when people overcomplicate the matter with their propensities to differentiate for the 
purpose of classification, which in itself hinders the progress of (or to) otium. Perhaps the most 
obvious hint that Seneca has provided us that simplification is the essence of what he is 
attempting to discuss is his use of the somewhat superfluous nisi si in both “quotations.” The 
notion of “except if” or “unless” could have just as easily been denoted by the appearance of nisi. 
Instead, he chose to make use of the occasional70 iterative form nisi si, which draws out the 
thought with no other addition than extra syllables. Similarly displaying the inefficiency and 
error in approaching otium in such a manner, Seneca also utilizes word placement to discredit the 
practice of parroting. Upon inspection, we notice that the sapiens is placed spatially closest to the 
res publica in the statement that ostensibly discourages public involvement except when the 
provided stipulation is met. On the other hand, the lines attributed to Zeno, who would 
apparently suggest it necessary for the sapiens to be involved with the affairs of state unless 
                                                             
68 De ot. III.ii-iii 
69 These sayings of Zeno and Epicurus are merely Seneca's own contrived summaries (see Williams, De otio III.iin). 
70 Allen and Greenough only offer knowledge of the fact that the usage of nisi si “sometimes...occurs” (§525.3a). 
Given the sparseness of explanation on the form and its usage, it may be suggested that it is either a truly rare 
occurrence in Latin or used only colloquially. 
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somehow deterred, display a complete absence of the Stoic sage. This contradictory arrangement 
of words, combined with the use of nisi si and even the inversion of typical Latin word order,71 
creates for Seneca’s audience a glimpse into his reservations concerning the secession to otium 
as dependent on activity that would taint it. He much prefers to simplify the matter, postulating 
in a succinct turn of phrase72 that both actually advocate the same behavior, only with differing 
motivational stimuli.73  
Seneca at Leisure  
Now that we have seen how Seneca would prefer not to approach the subject or practice 
of otium, we may take a look at the manner in which he decides to characterize the true nature of 
Stoic leisure. Once more with poignant brevity, he pontificates on the classification of those 
whom he would consider practitioners of the art of otium:  Soli omnium otiosi sunt qui sapientiae 
vacant, soli uiuunt (“They alone of all (others) who make time for wisdom are at leisure; they 
alone live.”).74 In the sections that follow, he expounds on this notion by primarily qualifying 
exactly what it is he intends in the usage of uiuere. Namely, he finds that those who truly live—
those who are genuinely at leisure—are those who have access to all the ages before them via the 
exempla they have relinquished for posterity. As the otiosi proceed in such manner through life, 
they experience freedom from temporal constraints, the complaints against which Seneca has 
only recently criticized. As we explore further, however, we discover that there is indeed quite a 
bit of freedom (as any interpretation of otium should suggest) to be had under the conditions of 
this lifestyle. These are freedoms that many have tried to achieve through the efforts of activities 
and behaviors Seneca has classified as impediments to otium:  freedom of mind, freedom of 
                                                             
71 The main verb occupies the primary position of each clause it governs rather than the generally expected ultimate. 
72 alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa. (De otio III.ii) 
73 See Griffin 329 
74 De breu. XIV.i 
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expression, freedom of will. In the remainder of this chapter, I will be concerned with the 
investigation of these liberties as they are illuminated by Seneca’s use of language in this quasi-
ekphrastic description of the otiosi. 
 Seneca recognizes that the most fundamental difficulty that the ocupati face is the 
obsessive compulsion to be occupied. The notion of incessant intrusions into the public and 
political spheres has captivated them so that they are set on a perpetual course eternally divergent 
from the path of the sapiens. To illustrate this idea of compulsive behavior Seneca employs the 
relative clause of tendency75 when he exclaims concerning those whom the ocupati encounter on 
their daily rounds:  quam multi erunt quorum illos aut somnus aut luxuria aut inhumanitas 
summoueat! (“How many there will be either whose slumber or extravagance or barbarity may 
drive those men away!”).76 Simply by making use of this particular sense of the relative clause, 
Seneca is able to display his comprehension of the essential inherent disorder shared by those 
who would abandon the quest for sapientia in exchange for more worldly pursuits. However, if 
the sapiens is to be so persistently engaged in the pursuit of otium and the true wisdom that it 
brings, he too is guilty of the obsessive behaviors of his antithesis. If both the ocupati and the 
sapiens function under the same basic modus operandi, what, then, becomes the point of 
distinction between the two? To find the answer to this question we must examine the manner in 
which Seneca chooses to qualify the remainder of his statement. He summarily finds three 
hindrances—somnus, luxuria, and inhumanitas—to be the source of woe for the ocupati as they 
endeavor to accomplish their goals. 
Freedom of Mind 
                                                             
75 Williams cites G-L section 631 as support for the claim of the grammatical construct's appearance here in the lines 
of Seneca (De brevitate uitae XIV.ivn). 
76 De breu. XIV.iv 
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 At the opening of this chapter, I included a quote from Virgil’s Aeneid that possesses 
some resonance with our subject. The deus to whom the poet is referring is named in a few lines 
prior77 as Somnus, the god of sleep. It is this deity who is charged with victory over Aeneas’ 
helmsman Palinurus, ultimately leading him to desert his vigil in a violent wrench of the rudder. 
In this scenario, the ship is offered as collateral for the defeat; however, there is more to be lost 
in Seneca's model. On the surface, already we find that somnus and its obvious denotations 
inevitably defeat the ocupati in their presumable efforts to attain vigilance through preoccupation 
with their environmental goings on. Just beneath the surface, though, lies the explication of 
effects of somnus, for slumber is only the eventual outcome of his influence. In order to achieve 
a sleep state, somnus must first dull the senses and lull the mind into creating a sense of security. 
Once their sensibilities are overrun and their faculties fatigued, the ocupati, like Palinurus, 
inevitably succumb to the wiles of Sleep. In the haze of figurative repose, their minds are laden 
with the weight of their onerous tasks, their innumerable house calls, their debilitatingly 
overwrought schedules. Where once they would have been said to be in dutiful search of utility, 
they now reside in a realm often tied to slothfulness and indolence78 rather than to 
accomplishment.  
 What we find here is that the unavoidable outcome of this rhetorical sleep becomes the 
forfeit of one's freedom of mind. No longer are we able to govern the world that exists there, so 
we then also become unable to affect any change elsewhere. Without freedom of mind, one 
                                                             
77 Aen. V.dcccxxxviii 
78 The Latin cognate indolentia, although somewhat different in meaning from its modern English counterpart, also 
plays a role in Seneca's view of proper behavior for the sapiens. In one of his letters to Lucilius, Seneca berates 
indolentia as possessing nothing of worth at Epistulae Morales LXXXVII.xix:  Itaque indolentiam numquam bonum 
dicam:  habet illam cicada, habet pulex (“And so I will declare that freedom from toil or pain (indolentiam) is never 
good—the cicada has that freedom, [as does] the flea.” ). Here, we find that those in possession of this characteristic 
are insects, or more aptly, parasites. Instead of offering aid and direction to the res publica as is the charge of the 
sapiens if at all possible, those who engage in this practice drain time, resources, and energy that they are either 
unable or unwilling to replenish. 
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develops the inability to engage in the manner Seneca prescribes:  disputare cum Socrate licet, 
dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis uincere, cum 
Cynicis excedere (“It is permitted to dispute with Socrates, to doubt with Carneades, to question 
with Epicurus, to conquer human nature with the Stoics, to exceed it with the Cynics.”).79 
Seneca’s use of licet here begins to reflect how important it is for the sapiens to possess freedom 
of mind. The impersonal nature of the word demonstrates that the Stoic sage is able to operate 
without any force of personal agency. The importance of this concept lies in the fact that it not 
only applies to those who would seek to hinder his progression on the path sapientiae, but also to 
the sapiens himself. With this in mind, we see that, given the optimal scenario, the sapiens 
surrenders the influence his own desires and compulsions would hold over his progress, an 
influence which would lead to an analogous scenario to that of the ocupati. Verbs such as 
disputare, dubitare, and quiescere also display solid connections to mental activity. What is 
more, however, is that these mental activities are performed with notable members of various 
and not necessarily complimentary schools of philosophy. Here, Seneca is able once again to 
allude to his disdain for the paltry divisions that preoccupy those who become involved in 
philosophy, showing that one is actually quite free to explore any and all of them if that person 
has achieved the freedom of mind that sapientia has to offer. Furthermore, while the verbs 
connected to the Stoics and Cynics (vincere and excedere) do express some agency on behalf of 
the sapiens, their direct object of and its correlative genitive of characteristic—hominis 
naturam—show that the sapiens is still free from the fetters of his mind. This is because he has 
conquered and exceeded the nature of humanity that would inevitably lead to his being mired in 
the mental activities of want and impulse thereby diverting his attention from more worthwhile 
pursuits. 
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Freedom of Will 
 Even though we have seen that personal agency can be somewhat of an impediment to 
satisfactory interaction on behalf of the sapiens, we must differentiate between said agency and 
the freedom of will. Now, considering that the determinism of one’s own nature is a concern for 
Stoics from their Greek beginnings to the time of Seneca, we are left with the problem of how 
this coincides with freedom of will. Stoics find that “...since things and events have different 
natures...the result of any individual's action accords with its specific nature.”80 We have already 
discovered that the ultimate goal of the sapiens is to triumph over and to surpass his nature, the 
hominis natura. It is here in this victory that we see the exertion of will rather than of agency, for 
agency is merely the product of human action, and "human action is controlled from within by 
assent and impulse, and the fact that man has no choice but to act by these powers tells us 
nothing against his freedom to act as a man.”81 In Long’s assessment, we find that there is 
indeed a differentiation between will and agency, and it is the latter that falls short of truly 
propelling the sapiens forward. Without the products of will, there is little in the way of sapientia 
remaining for those who would seek it because they are unable to separate themselves from their 
own natures in order to ascend to harmony with Natura.82 In yet another of the Epistulae 
Morales, Seneca relates to Lucilius that nihil tibi luxuria tua in futuros annos intactum 
reseruauit (“Your own extravagance has left nothing intact for your future years.”).83 With the 
entanglements of luxuria, there is nothing remaining for the ocupati that is unspoiled (intactum) 
by the absence of will that it engenders. Consequently, it is impossible for one to light upon the 
                                                             
80 Long 180 
81 Op. cit. 181 
82 The attainment of harmony with Nature is one of the primary concerns for practitioners of Stoic teachings. For 
more on its importance, see Shaw’s “Divine Economy: Stoicism as Ideology.” 
83 Epistulae Morales LXXVII.xvi 
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path of the sapiens while so mired in the throes of luxuria, causing the state to become an enemy 
of Seneca's prescription for sapientia. 
Freedom of Expression 
 When I speak of the freedom of expression, it is not in reference to that liberty identified 
as an American constitutional right; rather, I intend that ability to exercise the other freedoms I 
have just described. Given the etymological connections to sapor,84 it is essential that the sapiens 
ultimately exercise the freedoms he has acquired. Therefore, the inability to access expression 
becomes a serious problem. Motto alerts us to the fact that humane behavior was of utmost 
importance to Seneca, for she finds that “goodness and humanitarianism are among the most 
significant of Seneca’s ideas.”85 However, it is not solely an appeal to humanitarianism that 
Seneca makes by means of his employment of inhumanitas in De breu. XIV. This term, although 
certainly connected to concepts of cruel and inhumane treatment, has its roots in the ancient 
distinction between familiar and foreign.86 Considering this, the notion of barbarity becomes of 
primary concern. The connotations of barbarity bridge a divide between cruelty and the inability 
to communicate effectively. A barbarian was originally one who could not interact efficiently 
with Greek speakers because he lacked the linguistic capability; therefore, he could not express 
himself in any substantial manner, and, without this ability, he possesses no efficacy in his life 
given the present scenario. With the loss of the freedom of expression, the barbarian becomes a 
well-known paradigm against which prospective adherents to the precepts of Seneca may 
measure themselves. He is unable to affect any change in his own life or in his environment 
because he is unable to express any of the experiences he may have already acquired. By merit of 
                                                             
84 I will discuss sapor, sapio, and other related terms more thoroughly in Chapter III. 
85 Motto 56 
86 Oxford Latin Dictionary, inhumanus s.v. 1.b and 2: Examining the accepted denotations of this word helps open 
our view of the noun inhumanitas, seeing as how it is the result of the actions of one to whom the adjective may be 
applied. 
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this inability, he then becomes constrained by his own limitations rather than exploring the vast 
expanses of time and potential that are open to the sapiens. 
 Now, to this point, readers may be wondering why I have been discussing the qualities of 
those individuals who reject the advances of the ocupati instead of reviewing the shortcomings 
that they themselves possess. The fact of the matter is that I find these people who restrict the 
movements of the ocupati to be externalized representations of the intrinsic problems of their 
character. The evils of somnus, luxuria, and inhumanitas are what blind them, resulting in an 
utter loss of purpose because their sense of this is so inextricably tied to the various vices of 
public life. Being thus preoccupied, they are unable to achieve the goal for which they set out. 
Their constant meddling becomes nothing more than an exercise in futility, and, for this very 
reason, the ocupati cannot ever possibly ascend to the heights available to the sapiens. While 
they may be endeavoring to offer assistance to the res publica, the preoccupied masses are 
unable to make any changes, for they are too focused on the means rather than on the eventual 
end, so they would be likewise unable to discern when their efforts are misspent. For Seneca, this 
is the height of inefficiency and thus the demise of the agenda of the sapiens. He explicitly states 
that si res publica corruptior est quam adiuuari possit, si occupata est malis, non nitetur sapiens 
in superuacuum… (“If the Republic is more corrupt than can be helped, if she is occupied by 
evils, the sapiens will not strive on in superfluity…”)87 In this statement, Seneca makes it 
perfectly clear that the sapiens, despite a desire to be of service to his community, will not press 
on in mechanical redundancy to affect change where none is to be had. Ultimately, the sapiens 
must be observant and perceptive, able to read and to interpret the signals he receives from the 
situation in order to judge properly whether or not the task before him is truly worthy of his time 
and effort. If he can do this correctly, the sapiens is then capable of doing the most good where 
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the ocupati fall short due to their innate inability to properly judge their surroundings. In order to 
obtain this ability possessed by the sapiens, they must first relieve themselves of their 
expectations and the myriad means by which they attempt to attain them. As Conte puts it, “Once 
it is necessary for him to give up all expectations in the field of politics, the Stoic sage sets the 
achievement of inner freedom as his ultimate objective...”88 
 At the outset of this chapter, I said that there was seemingly a disconnect between 
traditional Roman values and the Senecan mindset. Such a disparate viewpoint would render this 
work moot, of course, along with its goal of demonstrating Seneca’s attention to the Roman 
mind as he writes. Therefore, it is necessary that we determine precisely how disjointed the two 
actually are. If this chapter has proven anything, it should be that Seneca least of all advocates a 
slovenly and unmotivated lifestyle. Quite the contrary, really. Although we find that he takes the 
occasion to attack the harried schedules of many whom he has observed, it is clear to us that 
Seneca would advise no one to be mere flotsam with no known goal in mind. The problem arises 
when Roman citizens, men who have been endowed with more freedoms than almost anyone at 
that particular point in time and space, fail to exercise them properly. As I closed the last chapter, 
I attested that an unfettered life would be one of the most precious commodities for these people. 
Accordingly, it becomes paradoxical if all the liberty that the industry of their forefathers gained 
for them is besmirched by the bonds of a civil servitude that actually provides little to no benefit 
for the society. It is for this reason, then, that we come to understand that Seneca does not contest 
the value of one’s due diligence. He would simply rather to direct that diligence to those areas of 
life that more thoroughly require our attention.    
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CHAPTER III: THE VICIOUS CYCLE COMES FULL 
CIRCLE—CONTENDING WITH “INEXPERIENCE” 
AND “NUMBNESS” 
 
Longum iter es per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla. 
 
“Long is the path through lessons, short and efficient by examples.” 
—Seneca the Younger, Epistulae Morales VI.v  
 
Though we have talked about a few words and concepts that Seneca would find 
particularly repulsive, it would seem as though we have forgotten to get at the heart of his Stoic 
agenda. Who is the sapiens? What constitutes the fundamental element of his character? To 
answer these questions, we must now turn to yet one more notion that proves to be problematic 
for Seneca. By exploring the pitfalls inherent in a state of inexperience, we will begin to probe at 
one of the most basic problems of the human condition and how it figures into Seneca’s 
reckoning. If I am correct, and the ineptitudes that spring from a lack of experience are truly 
inextricably imbedded in our natures as human beings, then we may begin to see Seneca’s stance 
on the matter revealed in his assessment of the Stoic goal. While discussing the abilities of the 
sapiens in regards to his ability to access all the wisdom of the ages, Seneca, as he concomitantly 
reveals his knowledge of Stoic teachings and distances himself from the school by means of 
third-person reference, alleges that those who would find themselves followers of said teachings 
would also find it possible hominis naturam eum Stoicis vincere.89 Throughout the course of this 
final chapter, we will explore the dangers of “inexperience” and “numbness,” examining the 
philological as well as ideological issues that arise when we consider the origins of the terms 
used by Seneca to designate the Stoic sage. As we dissect and analyze these terms, we will see 
                                                             
89 De breu. XIV.ii 
42 
 
that the qualities and attitudes of the inexperti are stark antitheses to those held by the sapiens 
and directly oppose the process of ascension to this level of mastery over human nature. Initially, 
however, we will present an argument that the cultivation of experience is indeed of pivotal 
importance to Seneca. Once that position has been made, we will then look more closely at the 
sapiens in order to uncover the origins of the vocabulary and the being to whom it is applied. 
 At the closing of De otio, Seneca seeks to make it abundantly clear that, in order to 
achieve the coveted state of otium and to number oneself among the sapientes, that person must 
be engaged in the practice of life. This is to say that those who truly seek the liberation of the 
sapiens need not simply wake every day to discover that they are inundated with the various 
trappings of a highly sociopolitcally charged lifestyle, for this would result in nothing more than 
the preoccupied state we discussed in the previous chapter. Instead, what Seneca desires for his 
readers is an attentiveness to the situations surrounding them that would lead to their enrichment 
as citizens of the cosmopolis. Nevertheless, even if one has cultivated such powers of 
observation, if they are not properly exercised, they are to no avail. So that he may express this 
concept to his audience with optimal clarity, Seneca crafts the final clauses of De otio into a 
conditional metaphor:   
Si quis dicit optimum esse navigare, deinde negat navigandum in eo mari, in quo 
naufragia fieri soleant et frequenter subitae tempestates sint, quae rectorem in contrarium 
rapiant, puto hic me vetat navem solvere, quamquam laudet navigationem. 90 
 
“If someone claims that it is best to sail while defaming sailing on that sea where 
shipwrecks may be accustomed to occur and where sudden tempests might frequently 
arise which toss the rower to and fro, I believe he would forbid me to set sail, even 
though he would praise the practice of sailing.” 
 
When we examine this passage, we find several clear indicators as to the importance Seneca 
places on the value of experience. The rhetorical devices he employs lend the coda of this work a 
                                                             
90 De ot. VIII.iv 
43 
 
poetic cadence, seeing as how those devices—namely, anaphora and alliteration—utilize 
repetitive verbal and vocal patterns. We notice that the verb navigare serves a dual purpose in 
this passage, providing the basis for both the anaphoric (navigare...navigandum...navigationem), 
as well as the alliterative (navigare...negat navigandum...naufragia...navem...navigationem) 
aspects of his allegory. Of course, any time such devices are used, obvious attention is drawn to 
those phrases and clauses in which they appear. Therefore, it is justifiable that we pay 
particularly close attention to this passage, especially given the fact that the manifestations of 
anaphora and alliteration are here so tightly intertwined.91 
 When we analyze more closely, we discover that those words that appear in the 
anaphoric/alliterative phrase here are imperative to understanding Seneca’s message not only by 
merit of their usage in the rhetorical devices themselves, but also due to their connections to 
important Senecan concepts. For instance, I would like to begin discussion on this issue with the 
appearance of the term naufragia. Although we see numerous instances in which the two 
thinkers diverge, it would seem as though, on the subject of the state of the State in their 
respective eras, Cicero and Seneca find a point of intersection. Residing in the tumultuous years 
leading up to the decline and dissolution of the Roman Republic, Cicero wishes to express his 
assessment of the condition in which he has found her in the course of his speech Pro Sestio:  
Sed necesse est...me totum superioris anni rei publicae naufragium exponere... (“But it is 
necessary…that I expound upon the total shipwreck of the Republic in the last year.”).92 It is not 
surprising that two men so concerned with the preservation of their societies would make use of 
                                                             
91 While it is indeed true that any example of anaphora will inherently also display signs of alliteration or assonance, 
the case in question exhibits extension of complimentary repetition of initial vocalizations beyond the bounds of the 
anaphoric elements, and, for that reason, I have attested here that this instance is one of particular interest. 
92 Pro P. Sestio Oratio XV.ii 
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this term in relation to public matters seeing as how the image of the “Ship of State”93 is such a 
pervasive one. However, with this message in conjunction with the notion of a shipwreck comes 
a strong element of foreboding. If we view the opening and closing sequences of De otio as an 
example of ring composition, though, we come to see that Seneca has explicated rather 
transparently what exactly constitutes the character of such a destructive national crisis. In the 
genesis of the dialogue, Seneca is careful to insert the verbs mutamus and fluctuamur in order to 
illustrate the root of the issue. At first glance, these verbs may appear to have little to no 
connection to the idea of a naufragium, yet, when we consider the imagery of tempestuous 
waters (fluctuamur), as well as the metamorphic elemental quality attributed to water itself 
(mutamus) intrinsic in the notion of a shipwreck, the issue of connection here is no longer so 
farfetched. With said connection established, we can begin to comprehend more fully Seneca's 
findings on the roots of the problems that plague his society. The manner in which he chooses to 
utilize mutamus indicates that the citizens have affected detrimental change in their sociopolitical 
environment (nam inter cetera mala illud pessimum est, quod vitia ipsa mutamus. “Among all 
the other evils, that is the worst—that we mutate the very vices themselves.”)94 of their own 
volition. Conversely, the passive quality of fluctuamur does allude to helplessness and lack of 
voice in the matter; however, it does not exclude its subject from accountability in Seneca’s mind. 
The reason for his lack of sympathy or, for that matter, of tact in this particular scenario is due to 
his claim that this predicament is the result of the fact that iudicia nostra non tantum prava sed 
etiam levia sunt... (“Our judgments are not only depraved, but also insubstantial.”),95 which 
reveals that conscious decisions (iudicia) on their parts have led their current state and uncovers 
                                                             
93 c.f. navem here: This metaphor of a nation symbolized by a sailing vessel is one that is prominent in the 
Mediterranean, originating in extant literature in Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes. 
94 De ot. I.i 
95 Op. cit. 1.ii 
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their underlying agency in the matter. Even with this consideration, however, the question yet 
remains concerning the origins of the dilemma the Roman people now face, for the use of the 
first-person plural and nostra surely indicate an expansive inclusiveness.96 Returning to the 
notion of ring composition, we may discover that the answer lies, as might be expected, in the 
fruition of the dialogue. 
 We can see that, although their actions are albeit perverse (prava) and fool-hearty (levia), 
there is certainly no absence of motivation. The problem is evident, however, when we realize 
that these actions are thence misguided-a product of a deficiency in experience rather than in 
action. The anaphoric repetition of navig- in the ultimate clauses of De otio brings to light the 
imperative nature of experience in Seneca's mind. He argues that those who praise the practice of 
sailing or navigation-metaphorically reminiscent of governance-and yet will have no hand in it or 
                                                             
96 The breadth of this inclusion may actually be a bit exaggerated here. Although some of the fundamentals of Stoic 
thought teach that all are citizens of the universal polis, we must be mindful of the fact that Seneca is a member of 
the upper echelons of Roman society, as likely would be a good deal of his readership. For this reason, we are left 
with the question of in whom Seneca sees the potential for true change-solely the Roman elite, or all those who 
would read his dialogue. If we compare Lucan’s usage of populumque potentem at Phars. I.ii, though, we may be 
able to arrive at some reasonable conclusion: Bella per Emathios plus quam ciuilia campos / iusque datum sceleri 
canimus, populumque potentem / in sua uictrici conuersum uiscera dextra / cognatasque acies, et rupto foedere 
regni / certatum totis concussi uiribus orbis / in commune nefas, infestisque obuia signis / signa, pares aquilas et 
pila minantia pilis (Phars. I.i-vii). (“Of wars [less] than civil throughout the Emathian plains and of justice granted I 
sing, as well as of a powerful people and familiar faces [who] have turned their arms against their own viscera for 
the sake of conquest, and, with the alliance of the realm undone by communal atrocity at the hands of all the forces 
of a world bent on destruction, [I will also sing of] standards matched against hostile standards, of eagles well-met 
and spears crashing on spears.”). Although, the blood spilled per Emathios…campos is mostly that of working-class 
citizen soldiers, those in command during the civil war that Lucan is describing are both responsible for the 
fratricidal bedlam that has ensued. Also, not coincidentally, these men are also prominent members of Rome’s 
senatorial class. The fact that Pompey Magnus owes his origins to comparable breeding as those men dying in the 
field only heightens the loss of connection between the potentes—the Senate, those at Rome who have the power to 
affect change—and the plebs. This lack of solidarity between fellow citizens is of course to be expected in a time of 
civil war; however, Lucan’s image here demonstrates to what gruesome degree those in power are willing to forget 
obligations to the State at large. Pompey’s role as not so much an antagonist or even protagonist as much as an 
antihero is mirrored in the governance of Nero who spurned the name of Ahenobarbus and who would have almost 
certainly felt little remorse at the less-than-fortunate circumstances that would face those of likewise lineage. And 
almost equally as certain is the notion that Lucan would not have overlooked this shared characteristic. With all 
these factors in mind, and if indeed Seneca and his nephew subscribed to analogous analyses, we may then be able 
to assemble a picture of Senecan citizenship. It would appear as though, despite the fact that Seneca would view the 
entirety of his Roman audience as citizens to whom his ethical teachings would apply, he also recognizes the 
oligarchical structure of his nation’s government. Therefore, those present in the imperial court and senatorial 
chambers do appear fundamentally culpable, yet this does not exonerate the remainder of Rome’s masses. 
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will attempt to dissuade others from doing so under less than ideal conditions have overlooked 
the value of the exercise. To demonstrate to us what that point is, Seneca has placed it as the 
concluding word of his dialogue:  navigationem. Here we see that the practice itself is the most 
important aspect we glean from our endeavors, thus Seneca's incessant insistence that those 
endeavors be of a sort which possess the ability to enrich ourselves via the experience derived 
from them. This recognition draws into perspective all the ideas-philosophy, preoccupation, and 
numbness-that we have previously discussed as they all ultimately represent an obstacle to the 
attainment of experience. Because Seneca finds philosophy to be inefficient in proffering 
enduring lessons pragmatically applicable to real-life scenarios, it is clear why worthwhile 
experience is not something he would expect to find in its pursuit. The familiarity that one 
acquires in a state of preoccupation is naught but an empty and habitual thrusting of oneself into 
the rigmarole of daily sociopolitical trappings with no greater dividends than frustration and 
fatigue. And lastly, numbness, implicit in its very nature, cannot ever provide anything of 
practically educational value because it leaves its willing victims alienated from the remainder of 
the world around them. So it is that we finally discover the ultimate evil for Seneca resides in the 
absence of engagement and interaction, for, without these endeavors, no one may taste the 
menagerie of flavors that constitute the lives they lead and that give the sapiens—a true 
connoisseur of life’s bittersweetness—his identity. 
The conceptions of the term “Stoic” in our own language presently often conjure images 
of stony, expressionless faces that reveal little to no interaction with the world around them. 
While it is true that emotions are a constant source of contention for Stoics, by merit of this 
strained relationship, it is evident that they are in no way disconnected from these emotional 
stimuli and the situations that produce them. As Shelton summarizes, “…the Stoic was 
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advised...to avoid emotional responses to situations. Emotions, however, were powerful, and the 
aspiring Stoic had to wage constant battle to keep emotions from the borders of her or his soul 
lest they enter, drive out Reason, take control, and thus make him a slave to his passions.”97 If it 
is so that Stoics are encouraged to “wage constant battle,” it should follow that this is not a 
passive dismissal of the stimuli that would evoke an emotional reaction. Rather, it is an active, 
involved rejection of external influence in the form. If one is able to combat these inclinations 
effectively, he or she is then able to arrive at a state that is unfettered, reminiscent of the realm of 
otium:  “...detachment from the world and from the passions that stir it runs parallel with the 
attraction to a withdrawn life and with the elevation of otium to a supreme value...”98 We can see 
rather clearly that emotional detachment is an imperative for the sapiens; however, it is also 
evident that this goal is only attainable with a considerable amount of effort. This effort must be 
directed in engagement with the sage's surroundings inasmuch as he must recognize those 
situations that would bring him to emit an emotional response—quotidian obligations, 
interpersonal interactions, joys, despairs, even his own mortality—in order that he may equipped 
to deal with the onslaught that would cloud his mind and impair his ability to react reasonably 
and rationally. Considering this, numbness, the result of a disengaged avoidance behavior that 
prevents assessment and subsequent determination of action, is a serious danger to the 
sensibilities of the sapiens. In order to demonstrate Seneca’s acknowledgment of this important 
issue, I will examine a passage of De breuitate uitae in which he calls to mind the barbaric 
excesses of the executions put on by Pompey Magnus. Here, we will find that Seneca has 
discovered the primary fault to be the lack of perception wrought by the numbness of the Roman 
general and his audience. 
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 Earlier in the thirteenth chapter of De breuitate uitae, Seneca has concerned himself with 
the criticism of useless knowledge; however, as he begins to discuss awareness of Pompey’s 
place of primacy in instituting the practice of pitting men against beasts in the Circus, there 
appears to be a cognitive shift. He decides to segue into a brief rant of sorts, maligning the 
decision to host such spectacles as distinctly inhumane (rei minime humanae.)99 He says in 
reference to Pompey, princeps civitatis et inter antiquos principes, ut fama tradidit, bonitatis 
eximiae memorabile putauit spectaculi genus novo more perdere homines. ‘depugnant?’ parum 
est. ‘lancinantur?’ parum est: ingenti mole animalium exterantur (“Chief among the citizenry 
and amongst the chiefs of old, when he has surrendered to renown, (a man) of remarkable 
integrity has contrived a memorable brand of spectacle: to kill men in a new way. ‘Do they fight 
each other?’ That is not enough. ‘Are they mangled?’ Not enough—they are crushed beneath the 
enormous burden of animals.”).100 The reiteration of princeps here cannot, I believe, be 
overlooked as a possible veiled expression of Seneca’s own displeasure with the principate; 
however, it also hearkens to the idea of one who is in a position of some ostensible utility to the 
public. For this reason, we should be reminded of the duty of the sapiens to be of service to the 
state, yet Pompey as he is herein represented does not fit the parameters Seneca would prescribe 
in this instance, so this contrast is particularly important to the reader's understanding of the 
correct way to examine this situation. If we consider the quoted material that Seneca has 
included as genuine prosopopoeia,101 then we find an interesting scenario. The verbs depugnant, 
lancinantur, and exterantur are not technically part of a tricolon crescens, yet the obvious 
escalation of the savagery of the display in conjunction with the anaphoric parum est brings into 
stark focus the point Seneca is attempting to illustrate. In order to slake the lust of the audience 
                                                             
99 De breu. XIII.vii 
100 Op. cit. XIII.vi 
101 See Williams De breuitate uitae XIII.vin 
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for violence and gore, Pompey must decide how far to push the progression of events, eventually 
concluding that each preceding option is just simply not enough (parum est) to captivate them. 
 What has resulted in this insatiable appetite for death? If we look just a few lines before 
this passage, we discover that the answer is an ongoing exposure to the utmost limits of human 
mortality. Roman audiences in this scenario are not only comfortable with such scenes, they are 
numb to them. These displays enable them to witness the bounds of life and death without 
examination or admission of their own so that they are indeed detached from the concept, 
however, in a manner that is deceptive and misleading. An appropriate analogy for such 
overstimulation is the incessant negotium of the ocupati. As we discussed in the last chapter, the 
ocupati are prevented from meaningful and efficient interaction by their own inability to view 
and to comprehend the situations that occur on a daily basis and to which they continually 
subject themselves. Likewise, those who would revel in the opportunity to watch the scenes 
Seneca has painted for us have lost touch with what it is they are actually facing. They are so 
bombarded with stimuli that they have forgotten how to react even when presented with imagery 
of an instinctively abhorrent nature and thus cannot reconcile themselves to the Stoic ideal of 
detachment from worldly passions because they have already permitted themselves to be 
detached, only by passive acceptance and eventual ignorance of their state rather than by 
engaged and thoughtful rejection of the sway that such things would hold over them. 
 In effect, what has come about is the absence of reflection, the true essence of numbness. 
Although he is superficially discussing the immense physical size of the creatures crushing their 
victims, Seneca’s choice of the word mole carries a different force here, as well. The notion of 
men being laden with the “burden of huge beasts” (ingenti mole animalium) creates an image 
similar to that of work animals laboring beneath the weight of the iugum. Taking this idea further, 
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if Pompey’s final decision is that men are to be placed beneath this yoke, what he is determining 
is that it is necessary for humanity to be subdued, their rational faculties anesthetized. However, 
Seneca has a clear solution for this problem than can only be accessed when one has vacated to 
otium; in essence, when one has rightfully taken on the title of sapiens. While immersed in the 
calm of the vita otiosa, there is then time for reflection, the true remedy for all those who suffer 
from overstimulation of any sort, whether it be political, spectacular, or otherwise. However, it 
cannot simply stop here. Once contemplation has aided in freeing the mind of the fog102 in which 
it was mired, it is then time to bring about effective actions in favor of or against the scenes 
witnessed on a daily basis. Then, and only then, can the dual nature of contemplation be 
completed, quoniam ne contemplatio quidem sine actione est (“…because contemplation is 
certainly not without action.”).103 
 In the title of this chapter, I referenced a “vicious cycle” and how the notions of 
“inexperience” and “numbness” complete it. If we take the time now to reconsider each of the 
topics in conjunction with one another, we should have little trouble in perceiving where this 
cycle leads. “Philosophy” itself can almost be considered synonymous with “preoccupation”; 
however, it may be more accurately comparable to one of the Platonic forms. All other 
entanglements set aside, at its core, “philosophy” for Seneca is nothing more than just that—
another distraction with which people are ironically free to occupy themselves. However, of 
course, it yet retains the connections to its Greek past, as well as to all of its permutations seen 
even in the age of Seneca, causing it all the more to become a stimulus for fruitless engagement. 
And it is this issue, this evolution into nothingness, that the author finds to be problematic with 
“preoccupation,” particularly when it is cast upon one’s shoulders of his own accord. While thus 
                                                             
102 c.f. caliginis mentibus, De breu. XIII.vii 
103 De ot. V.viii 
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preoccupied, those hurrying about in a frantic attempt to satiate their schedules and other 
appetites appear to lack any real connection with the situations or people they encounter, so, 
coincidentally, they lack any of the experience that could be gleaned. Finally, once their minds 
have been subjected to such a lack of stimulation, these people find themselves numb, void of 
any true connection to the world around them. Wishing to fill this void, many will turn to more 
of the same, searching instead to fill their coffers and their bellies and a myriad other orifices, 
real or metaphorical. Some, though, will look to “philosophy” as a means of coping with the 
absence of meaning, and the cycle continues as the holes in the fabric of their lives widen and 
fray. 
 For Seneca, these are those whom he desires most to aid, to enliven. These are his 
Romans whom he sees on a daily basis failing to achieve their full potential. Sadly, however, 
empire is a bed of complacency. With much of the world already conquered and residing beneath 
the control of the Roman standard, what more did the citizens of this glorious city have to devote 
themselves to? Roman citizens, especially those of the aristocracy, would have led comfortable 
lives devoid of serious controversy provided they steered clear of any political intrigue. But, at 
this point in history, a political career meant fealty and relatively close proximity to a maddening 
emperor with no signs of immediate reprieve save for the occasional whispered conspiracy. 
Rather than attempting to alter the situation at Rome, though, most seemed perfectly content to 
go about their lives uninterrupted and undeterred.   
 Seneca would not give up so easily, though. For a Stoic in Neronian Rome, the city 
herself could have been a perfect illustration of the all-encompassing cosmopolis. Discounting 
even the bounds of her empire, Rome played home to an unimaginable plethora of people and 
ideas, many of which may have owed their presence there to the indomitable ambitions of her 
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citizenry. Accordingly, it should follow good reason that, if the determination of these people 
could build this microcosm of the Universal City, then it should also possess the ability to set it 
aright once more.  
Before the foundations of a properly “literary” tradition are laid at Rome, what existed 
there was a permeable “music” culture that relied heavily on outside influence; however, “[b]y 
importing outsiders, the aristocrats who fostered the development of Musaic culture effectively 
guaranteed that it would be their unique possession.”104 Even though the possessive adjective 
“their” used by Habinek here most likely refers to members of the aristocracy, the fact of the 
matter is that what eventually transpired—the birth of Latin literature—belonged to all Roman 
citizens. They and all who would come after them would be joint heirs to a tradition that had 
been tempered by perhaps not as many centuries as their Greek counterparts, but certainly by 
more cultural input than they could ever make a claim to. For Rome had engulfed the world body 
and soul, and its soul, comprised of all the collective knowledge and artistry of all nations, 
provided the fuel for Roman literary innovation.  
I sought to make it clear in the Introduction that, without the appropriate voice, there 
would be no receptive audience. And throughout the course of this thesis I have tried to 
demonstrate how exactly Seneca does appropriate such a voice as to be perfectly understandable 
to the Romans of his day. It is now, when we have reached the end of this analysis, that we see 
that Seneca is actually involved in the same kind of imperialist actions as those who originated 
Latin literature. In the beginning, it is well known that Umbrian, Oscan, Etruscan, and certainly 
the Greeks all contributed to the development of the Latin language and its forms of expression, 
yet such an estimation leaves the Romans of that era too passive in their pursuit of a cultural 
identity. What they did, in fact, was harvest from their conquests all the choice fruits of their 
                                                             
104 Habinek 38 
53 
 
linguistic labors, creating a mode of speaking—a language—that fit the needs of this imperious 
and industrious people. However, during the lifetime of Seneca the Younger, the Romans had 
distanced themselves to some extent from that past. As said before, in lieu of revolutionary 
action on their part, the majority of Roman citizens seemed happy to go about their lives 
uncontested. What these people become, then, are strangers to their own land—not just the city 
herself, but to the entire institution that was and had been Rome. Nonetheless, this was not a 
deterrent for Seneca. For those disenfranchised in self-imposed exile from their fatherland, 
Seneca made the same plan as his forebears: to assimilate them. Like the fathers of Latin 
literature, Seneca annexes the language of these outsiders, these Romans who have strayed, using 
it to his own devices in a manner that they can comprehend. Thus, with the full versatility of the 
Latin language at his command, Seneca seeks to call these wayfarers back to a Rome of peace, 
prosperity, and public involvement, hoping such a familiar voice may help lead them home. 
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